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We modified classical mental exploration task introducing verbal modality. 
Consequently, we could test robust effects from lexical processing in an attempt to understand 
whether the underlying mental representation is strictly propositional.
In our three experiments, in addition to map modality (visual or verbal), lexical 
frequency, concreteness and visual frequency were also varied. The symbolic distance effect 
was replicated, regardless of map modality. Exploration of distances was regularly faster 
on pictorial maps. Effects of lexical frequency and concreteness were not significant for 
verbal maps. However, when visual frequency was introduced on pictorial maps both type of 
frequencies generated measurable effects.
Our findings directly contradict the assumptions of propositional theories (1) subjects 
were faster in the visual modality, which would be difficult to explain if the perceptual 
code had to be transformed into propositional, (2) word frequency and concreteness did not 
contribute as would be expected if propositional code were a default.
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Visual mental imagery is a mental event, which occurs when a “visual 
short term memory representation of the stimulus is present, but the stimulus 
is not actually being viewed” (Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003, p. 723). Mental 
imagery is also referred to as “visualizing”, “seeing in the mind’s eye”, “hearing 
in the head” or “imagining the feel of” (Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003; Thomas, 
1999b). Although theoretically each sensory modality would generate a specific 
form of mental representation (visual, olfactory, haptic, auditory, kinesthetic and 
gustative), visual mental representation are mostly studied and discussed.
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Experimental studies of the nature and mechanisms of mental imagery 
triggered one of the most notable debates in cognitive science – imagery 
debate (Pylyshin, 1981). The debate revolves around the question of modality 
of our mental representations. The competing solutions included a universal 
propositional code and sensory determined analog representations.
Theoretical predecessor of the imagery debate was Dual Coding Theory 
(DCT), proposed by Alan Paivio. This theory nicely elaborated a group of 
findings demonstrating a significant gain obtained in reproduction of concrete 
versus abstract words (Paivio, 1969, 1971; Paivio & Csapo, 1969, 1973). 
According to Paivio’s theory, cognitive system operates two distinct classes of 
mental representation (or “codes”): verbal representations (symbolic code) and 
mental images (analog code). Information obtained through language would 
be stored in verbal code, while information obtained through various sensory 
modalities would use visual or analog code. This implies that concrete concepts 
could be coded in both analogue and verbal code, whereas abstract concepts 
could only be represented in verbal code. As a result a concrete word presented 
in a free recall task, would evoke both analog concept and associated image, i.e. 
the two separate, but linked memory traces, one in each memory stores (verbal 
and visual). Such dual storing would clearly enhance a chance of recognition 
and retrieval for concrete words (Paivio, 1986). Subsequent experiments also 
showed that there are significant differences in cognitive processing of verbal 
and visual representations, particularly in storing and evoking, repeatedly 
confirming positive bias for visual material (Beg & Paivio, 1969; Paivio, 1975; 
Paivio & Lambert, 1981).
While Dual Coding Theory was mostly consumed with functional role of 
the mental imagery in memory and cognition, question of the nature of imagery 
itself resulted in a new experimental paradigm. These experiments investigated 
different metric characteristics of the mental images, size above all (Kosslyn, 
1975, 1980, 1981, 1994; Kosslyn, Ball, & Reiser, 1978; Shepard & Metzler, 
1971; Shepard & Cooper, 1982; Moyer, 1973).
Classical experimental stimulus in this paradigm was a map of an island 
with unequally spaced objects, so called landmarks (Kosslyn, Ball, & Reiser, 
1978). The observers’ task was to memorise the map layout as well as a position 
of each landmark. After five minutes, map was removed and the participants 
were invited to generate visual images of the displayed map, in order to scan the 
distances between pairs of landmarks. Observers were advised to imagine a black 
dot floating above map, travelling from one landmark to another. Reaction time, 
needed to mentally traverse from one landmark to another, increased linearly 
with physical distance among the landmarks. This effect was named symbolic 
distance effect (SDE) (Kosslyn, Ball, & Reiser, 1978).
Kosslyn interpreted obtained findings in terms of analog theory of mental 
imagery, strongly advocating correspondence between mental imagery and visual 
perception. Mental images are stored in analog code (also referred to as depictive 
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features, including the general structure, and the spatial relations. Accordingly, 
in analog spatial code larger physical distances would be represented with 
larger mental images yielding longer exploration time, a result reconfirmed in a 
number of clever experimental scenarios (Kosslyn, 1980; Kosslyn, 1994; Borst 
& Kosslyn, 2008; Pylyshin, 2002).
In addition to behavioural findings, empirical findings from neuroscience 
research provide a formidable support for analog theory and strengthen the 
evidence that imagery and perception share common processing mechanisms 
(O’Craven & Kanwisher, 2000). Several studies showed that mental imagery 
engages brain mechanisms that are used in perception and that, during mental 
exploration, visual area V1 is engaged (Kosslyn, Sukel, & Bly, 1999; Kosslyn, 
Ganis, & Thompson, 2001; Bartolomeo, 2002; Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 
2006; Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003). Activation of visual areas during mental 
imagery is content specific, i.e. different pictorial contents elicit activation in 
different regions of extrastriate cortex (Page, Duhamel, & Crognale, 2010). 
It is even possible to determine the content of single cognitive event from 
an inspection of the fMRI data from individual imagery trials (O’Craven & 
Kanwisher, 2000).
However, not all of the authors supported dual treatment of mental 
representations. Pylyshyn proposed all together different logic of mental 
codes, suggesting that an impression of creating a mental picture similar to 
perceptual experience is just an epiphenomenon, a mere accompanying event 
of a representational process, which is inherently propositional. All stimuli 
(verbal and pictorial) and all of their characteristics (including metric) are being 
coded in an unique manner, using separate propositions stored in long-term 
memory which are being evoked during the formation of mental image. The 
main disagreement between the two theorists concerned the spatial mechanisms 
of mental imagery. Unlike Kosslyn, Pylyshyn argued that spatial mechanisms 
of mental imagery were language related propositional mechanisms, which 
processed spatial information encoded in the form of discrete propositions 
(Pylyshyn, 1973).
Pylyshyn explains Kosslyn’s imaginary island map findings using the 
propositional distance mapping mechanisms. Mental distances are always 
mapped with propositional nodes, which represent symbolic carriers of 
information of physical characteristics of the perceived objects. Therefore it is 
no surprise that it takes longer time to mentally scan longer physical distances, 
as longer distances require more nodes. It is also possible that participants use 
their tacit knowledge of space relations, and act in accordance with physical 
reality taking longer time to traverse longer distances (Pylyshin, 1981).
Though the debate continued for several decades, there are still unresolved 
issues, concerning the very nature of mental representations used in imagery. 
Our idea was that a certain shift in the imagery island paradigm is needed in 
order to answer these important questions. Therefore we developed maps, which 
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SDE even with verbal landmarks. Also, introduction of verbal content enabled 
testing some additional hypotheses concerning imagery debate. Namely, if 
mental imagery were propositional in its nature and related to language, than 
robust factors of language processing would also moderate imagery processes. 
Hence, we applied two well know lexical processing factors – lexical frequency 
and concreteness – on the concepts used as landmarks. These two factors were 
chosen based on numerous previous studies showing that respondents are faster 
to identify high frequent and concrete words (Howes & Solomon, 1951; Whaley, 
1978; Strain, Patterson, & Seidenberg, 1995; Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983; 
Weiss & Rappelsberger, 1996).
Our experimental manipulations should generate opposite predictions 
from the competing imagery theories. Analog theory (relying on Double Coding 
mechanism) would not (1) predict the effect of lexical factors and (2) mental 
exploration of the pictorial material would be all together faster than of verbal 
material. However, if representational mechanisms are analog to language 
mechanisms, as propositionalists argue, the maps with verbal landmarks will be 
explored faster. According to this theory, visual code must be transposed into 
propositional, and that process would increase the reaction time. Additionally, 
lexical frequency and concreteness of the displayed content will also affect 
mental exploration speed.
EXPERIMENT 1
SDE is a robust phenomenon, replicated using different stimuli in numerous 
previous studies (Kosslyn, 1980). In order to resolve some of the dilemmas of 
the imagery debate, we modified the imaginary map mental exploration task by 
varying the properties of landmarks presented on the map. In this experiment, we 
introduced verbal imagery map, testing weather the SDE could be obtained on 
such maps as well. Both theories would predict the SDE for verbal material, as 
both theories presume existence of verbal code. In addition, the concepts used for 
landmarks were varied by lexical frequency. For this modification two opposing 
theoretical views predict opposite findings. Within Pylysyn’s theory such 
modification should produce results mimicking those continuously obtained in 
lingual experiments, a bias for frequent words. However, this is not an expected 
finding for dual codes theories. In their framework, lexical frequency should 
only affect verbal maps.
Method
Participants: Nineteen first year students of psychology at the University of Belgrade took 
part in this experiment in exchange for course credits.
Stimuli: Eight maps were created using Corel Draw graphic design software. Each map 
consisted of six lines, paths (80 mm long) and seven rectangles, landmarks (75 mm x 40 
mm) and had identical structure of paths and landmark. These maps did not follow island-likeIvana Ćirović and Sunčica Zdravković 43
structure, used in the classical mental scanning experiments (Kosslyn, Ball & Reiser, 1978). 
They resembled charts with singular connections between landmarks. Only the content of the 
landmarks was varied, half of the maps were pictorial (figure 1) and half were verbal (figure 
2). Concepts on the landmarks (both verbal and pictorial) were concrete, half of them with 
high (fr>100) and half with low frequency (fr<3) (Appendix 1) (Kostić, 1999).
Figure 1. Example of a map with pictorial landmarks
Figure 2. Example of a map with verbal landmarks
Lexical frequencies for the presented concepts were extracted from the Serbian 
Language Corpus (Kostić, 1999). Only those concepts with obvious visual representation were 
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similar manner. This was tested in a pilot study. A separate group of thirty participants was 
shown cards with pictures of the selected concepts (occupying a central position on a white 
background, without any textual or pictorial distracters) and invited to name the presented 
objects. Only those pictures that shown no variation between the participants were chosen. 
For this reason only a portion of characteristics usually controlled for in psycholinguistic 
studies (word length and structure) was applied here. Similarly, the visual characteristics 
usually controlled for in perception experiments (color, shape and contrast) were also not 
fully controlled. The control from the pilot study was restricted to cognitive factors of interest 
(mental representations in the function of imagery). Four maps were used as control, to test 
if the participants were able to fully memorize presented map and its content. Another four 
maps – parallel forms – were used in experimental trials.
Procedure: Participants were tested individually in a dark room in the presence of an 
experimenter. They were seated 150 cm from the computer monitor with their head in a fixed 
position.
Experiment consisted of four separate experimental sessions. Participants had three 
minutes to memorise the presented map after which map was removed, and the participants 
were required to generate a mental image of the memorised map. Then, they would begin 
mental scanning task. There were eight scanning trials, a pair for each test distance (between 
the two three, four and five landmarks), presented in the randomised order. First participants 
were instructed to locate a landmark on their mental map (instruction appeared on the screen: 
“Find the BALL on the map”). Three seconds later, another landmark would appear on 
the screen (“Find the PENCIL on the map”) followed by a message which would instruct 
participant to perform mental scanning between the two landmarks (“Scan from the BALL to 
the PENCIL”). When ready, participant would press button START to begin mental scanning, 
while pressing button STOP marked the end of mental scanning task, the moment when they 
have mentally arrived to the second landmark. The scanning was accomplished by imagining 
a little black dot flying above shortest path between the two landmarks, as instructed before 
the beginning of the task.
While experimental maps required only mental scanning, control maps involved an 
additional task. After participants finished scanning and pressed STOP button, they had to 
answer questions about the structure of the map. This served as a control whether participants 
memorised maps accurately. However these results were contaminated for the visual scanning 
purposes (as the maps were not only memorised but also rehearsed) and therefore not analysed 
with the rest of the experimental data. In each session, both control and experimental maps 
were presented, in counter-balanced order.
First experimental session was preceded by 4 practise trials (with another set of 
comparable maps) aimed to familiarise participants with the procedure. All participants 
successively took part in all sixteen experimental situations divided in four sessions. The first 
session lasted twenty minutes, while other sessions lasted about fifteen minutes.
Data analysis: Three subjects with reaction time beyond 3 standard deviations (in any of the 
experimental situations) were excluded from the analyses. One participant could not complete 
control task (i.e. memorizing of control map) and was also excluded from the experiment.
The data were analyzed using repeated measure analysis of variance with 3 factors 
(distance, frequency and modality). First factor, the distance, had four levels (distance between 
2, 3, 4 or 5 landmarks), the lexical frequency had two levels (concepts expressed with high– 
or low-frequent words), and the factor modality had two levels (verbal or pictorial).
Reaction time was measured as an interval between the participants’ pressing of 
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Results and discussion
The main finding on our modified stimuli material is a significant SDE for 
both types of maps, visual as well as verbal (F(3,18)=37,395, p=.000) (Figure 
1). Consistent with previous research, time required to perform scanning of 
imagery distance increased with an increase of distance on a real map. This 
finding proved that both types of maps could be equally used in imagery tasks 
and enabled us to generalize the rest of our findings to imagery debate. However 
expected, this finding alone does not distinguish between the two theories, 
and even the opposite result (lack of SDE) would generate equally substantial 
problem for both models.
Though both theories would expect the obtained finding, their explanations 
are very different. Analog theory suggests that SDE happens due to assumed 
analog nature of mental image. Namely, mental image preserves physical 
distances (Kosslyn, 1994). Contrary to that, propositionalists argue that mental 
distances are mapped with propositional nodes, symbolic carriers of spatial 
information. Since longer distances are mapped with more nodes, mental 
scanning of the longer distance will require more time (Pylyshyn, 1981).
Figure 3. Averaged reaction times of mental exploration
of the maps with verbal and pictorial landmarks
However, further scrutiny of the obtained data does facilities opposing 
predictions from the opposing theories. According to propositional theory, 
pictorial material must be transposed into propositional code, which is not the 
case when verbal maps are mentally represented. Therefore, propositionalists 
would argue that verbal maps would be scanned faster. Analog theory, if anything, 
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In our experiment main effect of modality was obtained (F(1,18)=43,931, 
p=.000). Subjects were significantly faster to explore the distances on the maps with 
pictorial landmarks. This finding contradicts predictions from propositional theory. 
Bias for visual material in mental exploration task is yet another confirmation of 
the existence of different codes engaged in representational processes.
Lexical frequency was also introduced aiming to discriminate between the 
two theories. Within propositional framework it would be expected that lexical 
frequency, robust factor of verbal processing, would moderate processes that are 
language like, i.e. propositional process. Hence lexical frequency should affect 
both scanning of verbal and pictorial maps, since both of them would eventually 
relay on propositional code. Analog theory would assume absence of lexical 
frequency effect, since mental imagery task is inherently visual.
Our finding showed that lexical frequency did not reach statistical 
significance. There was no difference in time required to perform mental 
exploration of the maps with high and low frequent words, nor between maps with 
pictorial landmarks, which could also be denoted as high or low frequent words.
Interaction between distance and modality was registered (F(3,18)=3.559, 
p=.020) (could be observed on Figure 3). Increase of the exploration time 
was significantly faster for maps with verbal content. That is, not only that 
our subjects needed more time to scan maps with verbal landmarks, but their 
exploration time was increasing more rapidly when more words were included 
in scanning task. On the maps with pictorial landmarks this enhancement was 
significantly slower.
None of the presumed predictions from propositional theory was 
confirmed, except for the finding of SDE for verbal maps. If mental imagery 
and exploration of images are representational in its nature, than pictorial code 
must be transformed into propositional code, and such process would increase 
amount of time needed to explore maps with pictorial content. But not only 
that maps with verbal landmarks were slower to process, lexical frequency also 
didn’t moderate exploration process on any map modality. Findings of the first 
experiment clearly support the analog theory of mental representations, which 
predicts faster cognitive processing of the pictorial material.
EXPERIMENT 2
One of the most important findings that had inspired Paivio to postulate 
two inherently different cods for mental representations was the idea of 
concreteness of concepts (Paivio, 2006). Concrete concepts (such as “butterfly” 
or “arrow”) would be represented both as an image and as a word, whereas 
abstract concepts (such as “beauty” or “wisdom”) could only be represented 
verbally. Paivio found empirical confirmation for two codes both on level of 
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1969). The difference between the two types of concepts seems to be deeply 
rooted even in development, and the two types of concepts appear to have 
different developmental trajectories (Vygotsky, 1986).
Our newly developed paradigm offered a convenient setting for testing 
the concreteness for both modalities and to question the depth of the differences 
between the two codes. Therefore, in the Experiment 2 we manipulated 
modality of the maps (pictorial and verbal) and the concreteness of the concepts 
presented on the landmarks (concrete and abstract). Analog theory would predict 
the positive bias for concrete pictorial material, which is double coded in the 
system. Propositional theory would stress the effect of concreteness in the verbal 
domain, where this factor has been clearly demonstrated.
Method
Participants: Twenty-three high school students from Petnica Science center took part in the 
experiment.
Stimuli: Four experimental and four control maps, equally structured as in Experiment 1 
(figures 1 and 2), contained landmarks presented with one of the following: (1) concrete 
words (2) abstract words (3) pictures of the concrete concepts (4) abstract pictorial material 
(Appendix 2).
Concepts were extracted from the Serbian Language Corpus (Kostić, 1999). Both 
concrete and abstract concepts had uniform word length and lexical frequency. Additional 
pilot study (with 20 participants) was used to ensure the adequacy of the selected concepts.
Abstract pictorial landmarks contained less familiar abstract textures from the paintings 
of the eminent abstract painters.
Procedure: The experimental procedure was the same as in the first experiment.
Data analysis: Four subjects with reaction time beyond 3 standard deviations (in any of 
the experimental situations) were excluded from the analyses. All participants completed 
control task.
The data were analysed using repeated measure analysis of variance with 3 factors 
(distance, modality and concreteness). First factor, distance, had four levels (distance between 
2, 3, 4 or 5 landmarks), factor modality had two levels (verbal or pictorial), and concreteness 
also had two levels (abstract or concrete).
Results and discussion
SDE was again obtained on all of the maps used in the second experiment 
(F(3, 22)=67.169, p=.000) (Figure 4).
The effect of modality, observed in the first experiment, was replicated 
only on the concrete level (F(1,22)=13,99; p=0.001) (could be also observed 
on Figure 4). Consequently, interaction between the two factors, modality and 
concreteness, was also significant (F(1,22)=9,05; p=0.006) (figure 5).
In this experiment we observe a positive bias for pictorial representation 
only on concrete level (F(1,22)=64,68; p=0.000). Interestingly enough, abstract 
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material. Another somewhat unexpected finding was the lack of influence of 
concreteness on verbal maps.
Figure 4. Averaged reaction times of mental exploration of the maps with
landmarks of different modality and concreteness
Figure 5. Interaction between the modality and concreteness.
No single code model could account for the obtained results (figure 5), 
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pictures (and none of the other three types of materials) in a single code 
modality. Therefore the explanation must be found in the models, such as 
Paivio’s, proposing two separate modalities. However within original theory 
(Paivio, 1986) certain equality was drown between concrete and pictorial on one 
side and abstract and propositional on the other. Our results do not support this 
categorization. Modality and concreteness appear to be separate factors.
Abstract pictorial material was probably the most advanced step away 
from the classical experimental paradigms. Even in the everyday communication 
mentioning something analog (i.e. picture-like) but abstract is an oxymoron. 
Keeping all this in mind we wanted to insure that our results were not a 
consequence of a particular random quality of the chosen stimuli. Therefore, in 
a separate experiment, we asked another 8 participants to perform the same task 
but viewing other three types of abstract materials (figure 6). Again we obtained 
the same results as in Experiment 2.
Figure 6. Three additional types of abstract pictorial stimuli:
fractals, Chinese letters and snowflakes.
The fact that abstract pictorial material had a different treatment from 
the concrete pictorial material does not necessarily contradicts model such as 
Paivio’s. The longer scanning time might as well be a consequence of a single 
memory trace. Only in this case it is not a verbal material without a pictorial 
trace but a pictorial material without a verbal trace.
However, the finding that there was no positive bias for concrete words is 
a problem for the theory postulating two different types of mental traces, which 
would enhance retrieval. We could conclude that maybe mental scanning, an 
inherently visual task, is at odds with any kind of verbal representations and the 
landmarks with concrete words did not produce the expected effect.
EXPERIMENT 3
Both previous experiments suggest that there are separate modalities of 
mental representation as well as a very articulated interaction between those 
modalities. In an attempt to understand these interaction we introduced verbal 
imagery map in the Experiment 1, abstract pictorial landmarks in the Experiment 
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Word frequency is a widely studied and confirmed factor of verbal 
processing (Granger, 1990). But just like with words, we are frequently exposed 
only to a subset of visual objects. Naturally, there is an expected correlation 
between lexical and visual frequencies: frequently seen objects would be 
named more often, used more often and therefore talked about more often, etc. 
Paradoxically, there are certain classes of objects that are frequently represented 
in our visual field but almost never named or talked about (bellybutton, for 
example) or even do not have a proper label (tip of the index finger).
In the present experiment we manipulate visual frequency in order to see 
whether the results would parallel those obtained with lexical frequency. In 
addition we examined the interaction between the modalities manipulating the 
visual frequency against lexical frequency.
Method
Participants: A different group of twenty-five first year students of psychology at the 
University of Belgrade took part in this experiment in exchange for course credits.
Stimuli: Four experimental and four control maps, equally structured as in Experiment 1 
(figures 1 and 2), contained landmarks presented with one of the following: (1) pictures of 
the concepts with high-frequent visual representations, which would be named with high-
frequent words (2) pictures of the concepts with high-frequent visual representations, which 
would be named with low-frequent words, (3) pictures of the concepts with low-frequent 
visual representations, which would be named with high– frequent words and (4) pictures 
of the concepts with low-frequent visual representations, which would be named with low-
frequent words (Appendix 3).
Concepts were extracted from the Serbian Language Corpus (Kostić, 1999) and word 
length was controlled. All words in the high frequency condition had frequency value of more 
than 100 (Kostić, 1999), and all words in the low frequency condition had frequency value of 
less than 3 (Kostić, 1999). Additional pilot study (with 35 participants) was used to ensure the 
adequacy of the selected concepts. In order to determine the visual frequency of the concepts 
pictures of the concepts were shown to the participants, and their task was to rate how often 
does the object presented on the picture occurs within their visual field. Frequency was graded 
on Likert scale (0=never, 1=once a year; 2=once a month; 3= several times a week; 4= once 
a day; 5=several times a day).
Procedure: The experimental procedure was the same as in the previous experiments.
Data analysis: The data were analysed using repeated measure analysis of variance with 
3 factors (distance, lexical frequency and visual frequency). First factor, the distance, had 
four levels (distance between 2, 3, 4 or 5 landmarks), the factor lexical frequency had two 
levels (concepts expressed with high– or low-frequent words), and visual frequency factor 
also had two levels (pictures of the concepts with high– or low-frequent frequent visual 
representations).
Results and discussion
Again SDE was replicated on every map presented in the third experiment 
(F(3, 24)=5,10, p=.003) (Figure 7). Both main effects of visual and lexical 
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Nevertheless, there was an interaction between visual and lexical frequency 
(F(1,24)=8,23, p=0.008) (Figure 7). Subject were significantly slower only with 
map made of landmarks of low visual and low lexical frequency.
Figure 7. Averaged reaction times of mental exploration of the maps
with landmarks of different lexical and visual frequency
It appears that visual frequency affects the outcome in this kind of task in a 
similar manner that lexical frequency biases lexical tasks. Results reveal shorter 
exploration time when participants scan maps with frequent visual objects. This 
was an expected result. Another expected result was that concepts, which are 
not frequent in both domains, take longest time. Both of these findings could be 
explained in a manner otherwise used to explain effects of lexical frequency. Due 
to constant usage, frequent words have a lower threshold, which leads to faster 
recognition (Whaley, 1978). We would assume that visually frequent objects 
would also have mental representation with lower thresholds, producing faster 
recognition in the initial phases of our task. Inspection of our results reveals the 
difference between the intercepts of the functions but not between the slopes of 
functions. This would be indicative of the differences in early phases and not 
the processing itself. The difference in slope, suggesting difference in process 
of scanning, can be obtained when the material comes from different modalities, 
which is the case in Experiment 1, for example (see Figure 3).
Although the present task has exclusively pictorial material, lexical 
frequency seems to play a significant role. This is particularly surprising, as we 
did not establish the effect of lexical frequency in our first experiment. There is 
a difference between the two conditions, though. In Experiment 1, maps were in 
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two modalities. The only other difference between the two experiments is that in 
Experiment 3, there was no mixture of modalities but the whole block consisted 
of trials within a single modality. This line of reasoning is implying an importance 
of certain order effects, but the underplaying mechanism remains unclear.
Finally, it seems that infrequent objects with frequent names are still 
processed fast. This would indicate an extremely efficient functioning of 
cognitive system, being able to gain from the high frequency regardless of 
modality. In other words, there is a gain even if the presented picture has a label, 
which happens to be a frequent word. Recently developed cognitive theories, 
such as perceptual theory of knowledge could account for the data obtained 
in this experiment. According to these theories cognitive representations are 
“inherently perceptual” (Barsalou, 1999, p 577) and even the conceptual symbols 
retain perceptual qualities (Glaser, 1992).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current study was conducted in order to determine the symbolic 
distance effect during mental exploration of imaginary maps with verbal content. 
In addition to this, we wanted to investigate whether various perceptual and 
lexical properties of the contents presented on the map could modify time 
required to perform mental scanning task.
SDE was obtained in a number of studies (Kosslyn, 1980) and on different 
types of pictorial material such as maps (Kosslyn, Ball & Reiser, 1978), real 
geographical maps (Stojanović i Zdravković, 2007), with variable number of 
items within a given distance (Thorndyke, 1981). In addition it was shown that 
the effect could also be obtained using objects instead of space (Paivio, 1978; 
Koslyn, 1973, 1975; Shepard & Metzler, 1971; Cooper & Shepard, 1973). 
Finally, the effects of individual differences (e.g. Paivio, 1971; Richardson, 1977), 
developmental stages (Lew, Foster, Bremner, Slavin, & Green, 2005) and training 
(Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2009) were also demonstrated. Present research 
adds verbal maps to this list of different material where SDE can be measured.
Introducing verbal content into imaginary maps enabled us to readdress the 
question of mental representations modality. Positive bias for pictorial material 
in mental scanning process indicates existence of different codes involved in 
mental imagery. In addition to this, visual frequency of the pictorial content 
moderate exploration of imagery maps. Unique coding models cannot account 
for these findings.
The fact that verbal material could be mixed with space-like context and 
produce effects that would hypothetically need analog representation is certainly 
theoretically interesting. However there is a practical side, too. We can conclude 
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in a similar way and could be used in everyday situations. Nevertheless, verbal 
maps should be limited to the situation where time is not of essence (i.e. in 
a shopping mall but not in traffic) as introduction of verbal material slows 
processing. Furthermore, according to our results the bigger the verbal map 
(meaning with more landmarks), the slower the processing.
Otherwise well-established factors of lexical processing (lexical frequency 
and concreteness) did not affect mental exploration of verbal maps. These results 
cannot be easily incorporated into propositional theory (Pylyshin, 1981), which 
claims that representational processes are propositional and related to language.
Although certain interplay between visual and verbal representational 
mechanisms is postulated in classical dual coding and hybrid models (Paivio, 
2006), there were few empirical and theoretical efforts to clarify the nature of this 
relation. Introducing the visual frequency factor provided us with a possibility to 
examine the relation of visual and verbal coding in mental imagery.
Dominance of nonverbal coding in mental imagery was demonstrated 
through the interaction of lexical and visual frequency. Although lexical 
frequency had certain moderating effects, visual frequency had superior effect 
in mental scanning process. These findings are supporting DCT, confirming the 
existence of interplay between separate codes in general, but also a dominance 
of analog coding in specific tasks, such as mental imagery.
These findings are yet another confirmation of the analog theory 
assumptions, based on DCT, which postulates existence of modality specific 
representational mechanisms, contrary to ideas of common-coding, propositional 
models. If mental imagery was based on common-coding mechanisms, visual 
frequency would not show moderating effects, and lexical frequency would be 
the only factor to affect mental scanning task.
Kosslyn and Thompson (2003) updated different analog code model 
into a rather influential theory of mental imagery, sometimes called perceptual 
anticipation theory. The essence remains the same: images within visual 
imagery are depictive or quasi-pictorial. These depictive representation would 
require specifically structured brain mechanisms, that is brain areas organised 
for analysis of analog information. Naturally, visual brain offers this kind of 
structure, especially primary visual cortex (areas V1/area 17 and V2/area 18). In 
opposition to perceptual anticipation theory is logically significantly more elegant 
propositional theory (Pylysyn, 2002). Not only that it requires a single coding 
mechanism and no translation– or bonding-between-the-codes algorithms, but it 
does not require described neural infrastructure either. However, data seem to 
incline to the less elegant solution. Kosslyn and Thompson (2003) analysed about 
60 relevant brain-imaging studies and in half of them early visual cortex was 
activated during visual imagery task. Based on such analysis we could conclude 
that the discussion on neural foundations of imagery is certainly not yet resolved.
The imagery debate is not the first time general psychology encounters the 
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of learning a concept of “cognitive map” was offered to explain maze behavior 
(Tolman, 1948). Cognitive map was very much analog representation without 
any need for conceptual counterpart and as such could have been found in other 
species but humans. It would be evolutionary plausible that the first concepts, 
such as those found in humans, have developed from the perceptual code. The 
notion of common representations for perception and cognition was dominant 
before 20th century and has returned in fashion. For Barsalou “conceptual 
representations are modal, not amodal. The same type of representations underlie 
perception and conception” (Barsalou, 2003, p. 521). In fact this author of theory 
of knowledge goes even one step further proposing that these perceptual notions 
are coming from senso-motor systems.
We would agree with this general framework. Also, our findings directly 
support the assumptions of analog theory of the mental representation. This 
theory assumes facilitation of pictorial material cognitive processing, and does 
not predict the effects of the lexical properties of the contents presented on the 
maps. On the other hand, obtained results could not be easily incorporated into 
propositional theory. Cognitive system performs mental scanning faster with 
pictorial material. These findings are another confirmation of the idea that 
different codes are engaged in representational processes.Ivana Ćirović and Sunčica Zdravković 55
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APPENDIX 1
Content of experimental maps in first experiment
Map 1 Map 2 Map 3 Map 4
Modality Verbal Verbal Visual Visual
Lexical
frequency Low High Low High
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RATTLE
(ZVEČKA)
CURTAIN
(ZAVESA)
HARPOON
(HARPUN)
WINDOW
(PROZOR)
DIAPER
(PELENA)
BOX
(KUTIJA)
SCHOONER
(KRIGLA)
BED
(KREVET)
MAGNET
(MAGNET)
PILLOW
(JASTUK)
LOBSTER
(JASTOG)
PENCIL
(OLOVKA)
CONDOR
(KONDOR)
BUILDING
(ZGRADA)Ivana Ćirović and Sunčica Zdravković 59
APPENDIX 2
Content of experimental maps in second experiment
Map 1 Map 2 Map 3 Map 4
Modality Verbal Verbal Visual Visual
Concreteness Concrete Abstract Concrete Abstract
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OLIVE
(MASLINA)
FREEDOM
(SLOBODA) 
BALL
(LOPTA)
THOUGHT
(MISAO) 
WINDOW
(PROZOR)
PREMONITION
(SLUTNJA) 
BOAT
(ČAMAC)
TIME
(VREME)
COAT
(KAPUT)
LOVE
(LJUBAV)
LAMP
(LAMPA)
IDEA
(IDEJA) 
TRAM
(TRAMVAJ)
CULTURE
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APPENDIX 3
Content of experimental maps in third experiment
Map 1 Map 2 Map 3 Map 4
Lexical
frequency Low Low High High
Visual
frequency Low High Low High
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